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Comparative Advantage in De-Globalisation: Brexit, America First and Africa’s 
Continental Free Trade Area 
*
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relevance of the theory of comparative advantage in the 
present realities of a world undergoing de-globalisation, that is, a retreat from closer 
integration. It presents eight arguments which analyse the theory as posited by Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo and which theory remains the underpinnings for trade 
liberalisation as regulated by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The arguments 
do not contend with the role and achievements of the WTO in the era of globalisation. 
Rather, they call for an acknowledgement of the changing realities of countries in the 
face of changes in the political, economic and legal landscapes, across the globe. It re-
examines the theory in light of the realities of Brexit, the retreat to ‘America First’ 
under the Trump Administration and, the ambitious plans of the African continent to 
establish a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) and a Customs Union across its fifty-
four countries, by 2020.     
 
1. Introduction 
 
The world is undergoing significant political changes. These changes have a direct 
impact on domestic economies but also on the future of trade relationships. Beyond 
the political changes across the world, there are also changes in perception and value 
of trade agreements from within developing and emerging economies who constitute 
majority of the global trade polity. This paper in acknowledgment of these changes 
presents eight arguments that re-examine the theory of comparative advantage with a 
view to adapting it to present day realities. Section 2 revisits the theory of 
comparative advantage as set down by Adam Smith and expounded on by David 
Ricardo. Section 3 develops the afore-mentioned eight arguments as a retreat from the 
simple interpretation which have been proposed in support of the modern rules-based 
system of trade under the WTO. The paper makes its conclusions in Section 4. 
 
2. Theory in the arena of de-globalisation- The Retreat: 
As an economic theory, there is no understating the impact and relevance of the 
theory of comparative advantage. The original expression on how countries can profit 
from trading amongst themselves according to Adam Smith, is reflected in his 
analogy: 
 
What is prudent in the conduct of every private family, can scarce be folly in 
that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity 
cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of 
the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some 
advantage. The general industry of the country…will not thereby be 
diminished…but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed 
with the greatest advantage. It is certainly not employed to the greatest 
advantage, when it is thus directed towards an objective which it can buy 
cheaper than it can make. (Smith, 1776, 478-9). [1]  
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Put simply, Smith’s view was that whereas one country may be able to produce more 
than one good to its benefit, where it will be cheaper to purchase one such good from 
another country than to produce the good itself, it is even more beneficial and indeed 
prudent for the first country to purchase cheaply.  
 
By the nineteenth century, another economist David Ricardo, had expanded on 
Smith’s view and proposed what is now referred to as the ‘principle of comparative 
advantage’. This principle holds that ‘each country will benefit if it specialises in the 
production and export of those goods that it can produce at relatively low cost’. 
(Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1998, p 689). [2] In other words, ‘each country will benefit 
if it imports those goods which it produces at relatively high cost’. (Samuelson & 
Nordhaus, 1998, p 689). [3] The WTO embraced the postulations of Ricardo holding 
it out it as ‘the single most powerful insight into economics’, (WTOa, 1990) [4]. It 
presents the case for open trade: 
 
…But what if a country is bad at making everything? Will trade drive all 
producers out of business? The answer, according to Ricardo, is no. The 
reason is the principle of comparative advantage. 
 
It says, countries A and B still stand to benefit from trading with each other 
even if A is better than B at making everything. If A is much more superior at 
making automobiles and only slightly superior at making bread, then A should 
still invest resources in what it does best — producing automobiles — and 
export the product to B. B should still invest in what it does best — making 
bread — and export that product to A, even if it is not as efficient as A. Both 
would still benefit from the trade. A country does not have to be best at 
anything to gain from trade. That is comparative advantage. 
 
It is often claimed, for example, that some countries have no comparative 
advantage in anything. That is virtually impossible. (WTOb, 1990). [5]  
 
The WTO is correct to the extent that it is impossible to claim in absolute terms, that 
some countries have no comparative advantage. The limitation to the assertion of the 
rules-based system is that the impossibility must surely only refer to a wrong 
presumption on the question of potential: that is, that a country cannot produce 
anything. Every country with its human capital, can by acting on its initiative develop 
opportunities and exploit its potentials towards developing comparative advantage. At 
the level of actual trade capacity, if countries do not engage actively in building a 
trade capacity whether for goods or services, no amount of economic theory can 
negate the evidence that for non-producing counties, a comparative advantage is 
virtually impossible. Why is this so? This is because in practical terms, and this is the 
crucial factor, some countries hardly have anything traded in the open market because 
they do not produce those goods and services others want, or are encouraged, to buy. 
There are a myriad of factors for this but the main contributor is the absence of 
dedicated investment (human and capital) in growing a sustainable trade capacity for 
goods and services.  
 
Modern life offers its own evidence of the challenges that confront a country in the 
development of a comparative advantage. From an international perspective, political 
upheavals, running conflicts, wars, internal displacement, migration, and economic 
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flux are huge problems that impede investments in trade. Domestic and regional 
factors are also significant inhibitors to trade, often neglected in the global discourses 
on growing comparative advantage. Poor education and skills capacity in the labour 
force, bad economic policies, insecurity, poor political relations across regions, 
inefficient bureaucratic systems, corruption of public officials, the absence of the rule 
of law, lack of funding, unstable and restrictive governments, poor technological 
capacity, are a few examples.  Today changes in political economy however present 
cause for a re-evaluation of the theory in order to ensure that the realities of present 
changes can be adaptive to the principles espoused by Smith and Ricardo. 
 
 
 
3. Revising the Theory of Comparative Advantage 
There have been other contentions with the standard interpretations of Ricardo’s 
position and indeed of the expositions on the theory of comparative advantage. [6] A 
particular concern has been with the application of the Ricardian conception, what has 
come to be regarded as the defining principle of modern international trade law, i.e. 
the theory of comparative advantage. [7] Our own contention is with the interpretation 
of the said theory of comparative advantage and its wholesale application to markedly 
different 21
st
 century political and economic realities. While the theory of 
comparative advantage makes perfect sense when left in its realm of market 
economics, it is a hardship when it is made the basis of law and applied in a rules-
based context across unequal trading partners, and inequalities across countries are 
deepening. This contention is based on eight points which ought to be kept in view in 
a modern interpretation of the theory for the purposes of regulated trade. These 
arguments are as follows:  
 
 
3.1 Recognition of the real parties in trade relationships 
The comparative advantage theory was proposed with the understanding that 
countries are the entities that determine the processes of trade in the international 
arena. However countries are not the real parties in trading activity. Enterprises, 
individuals, SMEs, corporations, multinationals, are.  Trebilcock and Howse (2005), 
see it as an ‘unfortunate semantic legacy’ of the comparative advantage theory, which 
continues to cite countries as the parties in international trade. [8] In presenting 
countries as the parties to trade, this issue of comparative adv ntage is not without 
conundrum. Will a country’s comparative advantage refer to the income earning 
potential for a scarce resource which is in high demand (such as oil or diamonds), or 
does it simply refer to any factor of production or any natural resource which a 
country has in greater supply than its counterparts (for instance, vast arable land, 
unskilled labour, primary goods)? 
 
In the first situation, great demand for scarce resources may appear to grant a country 
a comparative advantage. So, mining diamonds may yield huge returns to a country’s 
GNP. But will it improve the lives of the majority? The answer is: not necessarily. 
This is because it may not employ the most number of people. If a foreign 
technologically-proficient corporation is contracted by the host government to mine a 
scarce resource like diamonds as is the case in the mining regions of Central and 
South Africa, the labour force utilised will be negligible.  
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Africa’s Botswana hailed as an example of the gains of comparative advantage from 
trade provides a useful example. Generally, Botswana’s economic growth can be 
ascribed to mineral and beef exports, tourism, and donor aid. [9] However, diamonds 
are by far the most important source of income for Botswana since their initial 
discovery in 1967, a situation which should prove of no surprise given the high 
demand and high price of diamonds. [10] In the country’s 1998 Trade Policy Review 
(TPR), the WTO noted that only about 3.5%, were formally employed in that sector. 
The TPR reported that ‘shortage of labour is a major constraint on the development of 
manufacturing industry.’ [11] The Botswana Government Report for the same period 
in turn confirmed that ‘Botswana's economic base remains narrow, with one third of 
GDP in 1996 and some 50% of government revenues in the same year stemming from 
the mineral sector’. [12]  
 
As at 2010, the combined earnings of the three mining operations in the country, all 
incidentally operated by a single private company - the De Beers Group, accounted 
for 77% of total export earnings and about 45% of the GDP of Botswana. [13] The 
Botswana government (with 15% shareholding) shares joint ownership with two 
others in the De Beers group: Anglo-American (45%) and Central Holdings 
(representing the Oppenheimer family with 40%). Its global mining operations 
employ approximately 20,000 people in its operating sites in Botswana, Namibia, 
South Africa, Tanzania and Canada and around the world; about 7000 of those 
employees are in Botswana. [14]  
 
It must be noted that this phenomenal success did not counter the domestic evidence. 
When other countries enter the market, there is an impact on a once dominant player 
as the statement below demonstrates:  
 
Botswana’s own domestic market has been under threat since South Africa 
emerged from the apartheid era and has gradually opened up its market to 
foreign competition. The first real test was when South Africa negotiated a 
free trade agreement with the EU; this agreement was a de facto free trade 
agreement with all the SACU member states. The second eye-opener was the 
challenge faced by the EU in the WTO on its discriminatory preferential 
market access (under the Lomé Agreement) to a select number of African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. This meant that preferences enjoyed 
by Botswana (mainly for its beef exports) were coming to an end. (Mbekeani, 
2005) [15]  
 
Connected with the above reality and a second contention is the question on the 
specific subject of the theory that is, what does the theory presume countries actually 
trade: finished or unfinished goods?  
 
3.2 The nature of traded goods matters 
Countries that sell finished goods have a greater chance of making gains on the open 
market. Countries that sell unfinished goods or raw materials do not have the same 
successes. An examination of the year on year data for top trading economies on any 
global data compilation is evidence of this reality. Yet, the fact that the comparative 
advantage theory refers to finished and not unfinished products have little bearing on 
how countries can maximise their potential for comparative advantage and thereby 
what gains can be made from trade.  
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For instance, it is common knowledge that what Africa trades most is in raw materials 
– oil, textiles, cotton, minerals, and low skilled labour. Lacking sophisticated 
industrial expertise, raw materials are sold in their primary state to supply the 
industries of developed countries with these materials including minerals such as oil 
and diamonds. In the sophisticated modern global economy with ever-changing 
consumer preferences and rapid technological advancements in manufacturing, 
possession of raw materials alone puts any country at a distinct disadvantage. Again 
the case of Botswana provides insight. An economist from the Botswana Institute for 
Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA) commented as follows: 
 
While the diamond sector is by far the leading sector of the Botswana 
economy in terms of its contribution to gross domestic product and foreign 
exchange earnings, its contribution to employment is extremely low (under 
3.6%) due to the high capital intensity of diamond mining and the fact that 
most of the diamond is exported in rough form. As a result of the low 
contribution to employment and fear of losing the market for beef in the EU, 
the authorities have adopted an industrial strategy aimed at promoting non-
diamond industries both for export and local consumption. [16]  
 
There is no doubt that countries must have to offer improved goods and labour; 
improved in the sense that goods will need to be processed into a secondary state in 
order to compete in the global market. It is the same with labour and the trade in 
services which benefit the more sophisticated service providers in the international 
market.  
 
That is not all. A third argument is the reality of the state of political economy in a 
trading country.  
 
3.3 The impact of changes in domestic political economy on trade relations 
Possession of a particular factor of production in abundance does not necessarily 
guarantee that a country will make any gains by that fact alone. A vast land mass may 
be restricted by government land-ownership laws, a common historical feature of 
Asian economies, or may be owned by a small section of the rich or political class in 
the country, a common feature of a number of African countries. A huge labour force 
if it is largely comprised of unskilled persons may limit the comparative advantage to 
be exploited from skilled labour-intensive operations. For example, the huge 
undeveloped land mass and young labour force of the entire African continent has not 
detracted from the superior position of the European Union (EU) and the United 
States of America (USA) in producing agricultural goods. Apart from the 
sophisticated and technologically advanced agricultural practices of these countries, 
the strategic subsidisation programmes in these countries consistently thwart whatever 
‘natural’ comparative advantage the African continent may have in agricultural 
enterprise.  
 
Needless to say, abundant resources still need to be effectively harnessed towards 
producing goods or services that can compete in the global market. Without well-
structured policies to achieve this, a country may be blessed with land, natural 
recourses, labour, capital, and may yet remain unable to make anything out of this 
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abundance. If it undergoes any changes in its political affairs, it may also have to 
redefine its interests and renegotiate trade relationships with others. 
 
3.3.1 Brexit: changes in political economy 
The proposed exit of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU aka Brexit and the 
election of a business-minded Donald Trump as the 45
th
 American President have 
thrown this reality into sharper focus. Brexit is the consequence of the decision by the 
people of the United Kingdom not only against continued political and economic 
interdependence with Europe, but mainly against regulated interdependence. The 
economic benefit to the UK from its membership of what was then the European 
Community since 1973 has been significant in 2016, as observed by Kayleigh Lewis 
(2017) below: 
According to 71% of all members of the Confederation of British Influence 
(CBI), and 67 per cent of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the EU 
has had an overall positive impact on their business. 
The CBI estimates that the net benefit of EU membership is worth 4-5% of 
GDP to the UK, or £62bn-£78bn per year. 
In 2014, the ONS reported that the EU, which is the world’s biggest economy, 
accounted for 44.6 per cent of all UK exports of goods and services, and 53.2 
per cent of the UK’s imports of goods and services.  
Meanwhile, the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) 
shows the overall contribution to our economy from exports to the EU was 
£187 billion last year, and that it could rise by almost half again to £277 
billion a year by 2030. [17]  
 
Despite the favourable statistics, on 23 June 2016 the UK voted in a referendum, to 
leave the EU.  
 
This proposed change in its international relations had significant domestic legal 
impact. Of primary concern was the potential impact on trade and business, on the UK 
economy, which had benefitted immensely from the foundational provisions of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU 2007) [18]: on freedom of 
movement for goods (Articles 34-36), of services (Articles 49 and 56),  of labour 
(Article 45) and of capital (Article 63). Although the people had voted in favour of 
Brexit, a question arose as to whether UK Ministers had a right to withdraw from the 
EU without the authority of an Act of Parliament authorising them to do so. In R 
(Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [19] the UK Supreme 
Court (the Court) affirmed the decision of the Divisional Court, holding that an Act of 
Parliament authorising Brexit was necessary before the UK could proceed with 
negotiations on withdrawal from the EU.  
 
The argument of the Secretary of State was that the Minsters could give Notice under 
Article 50 of the TFEU that the UK would withdraw from the EU without any need 
for authorisation from Parliament. This argument was based on “the existence of the 
well-established prerogative powers of the Crown to enter into and to withdraw from 
treaties.” [20] The Court in response noted the following: 
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Originally, sovereignty was concentrated in the Crown, subject to limitations 
which were ill-defined and which changed with practical exigencies. 
Accordingly, the Crown largely exercised all the powers of the state ... 
However, over the centuries, those prerogative powers, collectively known as 
the Royal prerogative, were progressively reduced as Parliamentary 
democracy and the rule of law developed. By the end of the 20th century, the 
great majority of what had previously been prerogative powers, at least in 
relation to domestic matters, had become vested in the three principal organs 
of the state, the legislature (the two Houses of Parliament), the executive 
(ministers and the government more generally) and the judiciary (the judges). 
[21] 
 
The Court then noted that “it is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution that, 
unless primary legislation permits it, the Royal prerogative does not enable ministers 
to change statute law or common law”. [22] On the specific nature of the EU Law 
brought into the UK domestic legislation by the European Communities Act of 1972, 
the Court noted that “although the 1972 Act gives effect to EU law, it is not itself the 
originating source of that law” [23]. It was therefore of the view that  “in light of the 
terms and effect of the 1972 Act, and subject to considering the effect of subsequent 
legislation and events, the prerogative could not be invoked by ministers to justify 
giving Notice: ministers require the authority of primary legislation before they can 
take that course” [24]. Negotiations with EU were theretofore halted pending the 
required authority from Parliament. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 The future of UK trade 
As earlier noted Brexit’s implications are not only political but also economic. New 
realities about future trade relations between the UK and the EU are also emerging; 
indeed trade is the most difficult area of negotiations for the future after Brexit. But 
what are the implications for the theory of comparative advantage and the realities of 
de-globalisation? Apart from having goods available in a condition that other 
countries are willing to pay to buy, sound economic and trade policies by 
governments determine in no small measure the success of trade endeavours. In the 
instant case of the UK for example, one notes that from 1999 to 2016, trade between 
the EU and the UK has been of mutual benefit: to the UK, its (financial and business) 
services sector and to the EU, its goods sector respectively (UK House of Commons, 
2017, p3). The UK has consistently recorded a deficit to the EU for goods trade for 
the same period. (UK House of Commons, 2017, p4). [25]  
 
As Figure 1 below shows, Romei (2017) notes that:  
With all the talk of stronger trade relationships with other markets, only 
Australia, Switzerland and Japan currently account for UK exports shares of 
between 2 and 5 per cent. All other markets, including Canada and China, 
account for 1 per cent or less of UK services. [26]. 
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Figure 1: UK exports trade 2016 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows UK performance in in trade for services with the rest of the EU. In 
this regard, Romei (2017) again notes that:  
 
The UK is also highly dependent on EU services imports. About half of all 
services imported into the UK originate in the EU, particularly travel and 
business services. The latter, which include research and development, and 
scientific and technical services, are used as inputs into both the UK services 
and manufacturing sector. The importance of services for other sectors is 
sometimes underestimated. 
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Figure 2: UK-EU trade in services 
  
 
 
Following Brexit, the future of UK-EU trade if it is to benefit both sides but the UK in 
particular, requires re-adjustment of policies and priorities if the UK’s comparative 
advantage in the financial and business services sector is to be maintained. Pursuing 
trade negotiations without a clear strategy by the UK government on how to maximise 
its advantage in the services sector will have serious consequences for both its 
economy and its political space. The results of the Brexit referendum forced the then 
Prime Minister David Cameron his position. A trade deal that does not ensure UK’s 
comparative advantage in services will no doubt be equally disastrous for the 
government of the day. 
 
Our fourth contention stems from the observation of the politics of bargaining and the 
ever increasing demand for reciprocity not only operative under the multilateral 
system but also in the realm of international relations.  
 
3.4 Trade is not that simple 
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The practicalities of trade negotiations are more complex than the basic 
considerations of the theory which envisioned and describes a relatively 
straightforward and simple agreement between two countries. In the theory, it is 
simply about which country will produce what goods. Yet a picture of countries as 
being in an independent position to determine what they should produce and to whom 
to sell is misleading to those who do not engage with the multilateral nature of trade 
talks – it involves a lot of interests, often diverging interests. The globalisation 
initiative which paved the way for a rules-based system of global trade and spread the 
appeal of trade liberalisation demands cross-border market access and a non-
discriminatory trade regime, features for which many countries were unprepared at 
their time of accession. Although countries including Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) have some special treatment to allow for their relatively weaker economies, 
membership of the WTO has certainly not brought the exponential economic growth 
weaker trading economies thought it would.  
 
A principal reason is the character of the rules-based system. The WTO expects its 
Member States to observe its basic principles – the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and 
Non-discriminatory Treatment (NT) across the Organisation’s membership. These 
principles in turn discount the possibility of countries unilaterally deciding with 
whom to trade without resorting to the exemptions under the WTO Agreements. [27] 
There can indeed be legal departures from the global system. However such 
departures must comply with the rules. The creation of Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTA), Free Trade Areas (FTA) a d Customs Unions is one possible legal departure 
from the MFN and NT principles. The EU has made gains via its regional integration 
in its WTO membership where a single vote by the EU is representative of the wishes 
of each of its Member states. Apart from satisfying the rules, more practically, the 
success of trade integration outside the WTO depend in turn on the extent of 
integration across the countries that constitute that union or FTA. Smaller numbers of 
countries are more likely to negotiate complex trade agreements more peaceably, and 
quickly. Can a large group do the same?  
 
Aside from Brexit, already there is concern about the future of long existing trade and 
investment regimes including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between the USA, Canada and Mexico. [28] If examples of regional integration, like 
the EU, can suffer losses in its membership such as is the case with Brexit, what is the 
future for arrangements of a similar nature? The EU comprised 28 countries.  The AU 
believes that the fifty-four countries of the African continent stand to make better 
gains from a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). Much of Africa’s political 
relations still remains tied to political colonial interests or in present times, Chinese 
business interests. Without strong economic and social integration amongst African 
nations, can Africa effectively build up a FTA?  
 
 
3.4.1 The African Union (AU) Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)  
As mentioned above, Brexit has raised questions as to the permanency of interests 
even in a beneficial economic arrangement such as the EU. The proposal by the AU, 
is for an African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) to be achieved in 2017 and an 
economic union to be established by 2019. It has been suggested that a “50 per cent 
increase in intra-African trade above a 2012-baseline can be achieved by 2022 if a 
continental free trade is in place by 2017”. [29] The expected completion date for the 
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CFTA was 29 December 2017 (AU, 2017). On the face of it, a CFTA could be seen as 
a long overdue trade and investment strategy by African governments. Nevertheless it 
cannot be denied that despite political pronouncement within and beyond the 
continent on the need to develop Africa’s trade capacity, intra-African trade is hardly 
significant. [30] Mevel and Karingi (2012) have previously noted that “trade flows 
within African economies remain at low levels with nearly 11% of total Africa’s trade 
being intra-trade in 2010.” [31] 
 
The proposal by the AU for a Free Trade Area is for an even bigger entity comprising 
more countries than both the EU and the NAFTA combined. In a continent with a 
multitude of trade blocs and sub regional agreements, a Free Trade Area appears to be 
more a theoretical than a practicable enterprise. The main trading blocs and their 
Member States include: 
 
 
Table 1: Main African trade blocs: 
 
             Trading Arrangements    Member States 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) 
Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Arab Republic of 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Zambia & Zimbabwe 
South African Development Community 
(SADC) 
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia & 
Zimbabwe 
South African Customs Union (SACU) Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa & 
Swaziland 
West African Economic and Monetary Union  
(UEMOA) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal & Togo 
Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, 
the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone & Togo 
Central African Customs and Economic Union 
(UDEAC) 
Cameroon, the Central Africa Republic, Chad, 
the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea & 
Gabon;  
Economic Community of Central Africa States 
(ECCAS) 
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central Africa 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Rwanda and Sao Tome & Principe 
East Africa Community (EAC) Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; Cross border 
Initiative Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia & Zimbabwe 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa (CEMAC) 
Cameroon, the Central Africa Republic, Chad, 
the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, and Sao Tome & Principe 
Economic Community of the Countries of the 
Great Lakes (C E P G L ) 
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo & 
Rwanda 
Indian Ocean Commission Comoros Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion & Seychelles 
Mano River Union (MRU)  Guinea, Liberia & Sierra Leone 
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Data source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India 2017  
 
As can be seen from Table 1 above, there are parallel and multiple memberships. So 
long as the proposed CFTA does not breach the WTO rules, there is no problem. The 
greater problem is within the Free Trade Area and its Customs Union: Will there be 
radical departures in the constitution of its existing sub-regional trade arrangements in 
a future African CFTA? The main operating bodies are ECOWAS, SADC, and 
COMESA and so the countries who share these platforms may help to sustain the 
CFTA initiative. It has to be said however that the CFTA has decidedly ambitious 
projections. Its objectives include enhancing competitiveness across all industries 
even if industrial capacity across Africa is low; overcoming the dependence on export 
of raw materials which is a huge challenge in the absence of advanced technologies 
required for contemporary manufacturing processes; removing the need for multiple 
memberships across its many trading blocs; to increase intra-African trade by 50% by 
2020, and; to create a free market for its goods and services. (Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community, 1991). [32]  
 
What are the implications for free movement of peoples and immigration, a pillar of 
the EU arrangement which nevertheless played crucially in the Brexit decision? How 
will Africa enhance intra-African trade and investment while also exploring global 
trade opportunities? In any event, the primary benefit of closer integration albeit on 
such a grand scale are with respect to regulation and implementation: it will be much 
easier to harmonise and standardise economic and trade rules in a CFTA than it is at 
present with a myriad of trade blocs. It is also easier to do so in line with global trade 
rules under the WTO, given that the CFTA is a legal exception to the principles of 
trade liberalisation and so is in compliance with the WTO rules, as it is. Perhaps the 
outstanding issue is this: how can the CFTA facilitate Africa’s capacity for finished 
goods and skilled services and drive the countries towards a comparative advantage in 
the global market? This leads on to our fifth argument. 
 
3.5 Comparative advantage is not automatic or guaranteed 
In the modern global market, a country’s comparative advantage is more likely to 
arise as a consequence of a profitable exercise in international trade. That is to say, as 
a country’s trade activity in the global market increases and its goods maintain a 
significant market share, then the country may proceed to increase its production 
capacity for that good. China is a good reference point. One of the strong developing 
countries in the global market, China has become a global competitor in 
manufacturing for a wide range of goods, both home goods and industrial goods. It 
could be said to have a comparative advantage over such merchandise than most of its 
counterparts; indeed it presents a competition for developed country technical and 
industrial manufacture. Yet this comparative advantage only arose as a consequence 
of China’s long and continued manufacturing activity which yielded lower costs for 
production stabilising its trading activity in this area to its advantage. The 
consequences of China’s growth and its prospects for the global economy, are still 
uncertain; they may well present a far different reality than imagined. 
 
The point here is that in the context of a global competitive trading system, a 
comparative advantage does not automatically arise on its own. It may well be 
dependent on the sales performance of a good or a trading activity in the global 
market. If there is the will and the focused strategy to pursue such ambitions, it is 
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possible should developing countries have the enabling environment for productive 
capacity and the socio-economic improvements in living standards, that they may 
indeed gain comparative advantage in certain areas which have hitherto been 
considered areas of developed country advantage. In the multilateral trading system 
especially, it may well be that ‘it is the gains from trade that implies the pattern of 
trade, not the reverse. [33] A country may thus have a comparative advantage after a 
rewarding pattern of trade and not before embarking on a trading arrangement.  
 
 
3.6 Inequalities are real and will impact negotiations  
There is a presumption that countries are always in an equal bargaining position and 
so that trade negotiations are always fair and mutually beneficial. This is not always 
the case. In reality, under the global economic system, inequalities exist both in the 
capacity to supply goods or services to trade, and in the capacity to participate in the 
trading system. The distinction between developed, developing, and least developed 
countries at the WTO acknowledges these inequalities. In a trading relationship, 
where a strong party perceives itself to be in an unequal and unbeneficial relationship, 
the trade relationship is put under pressure. NAFTA under the Trump administration 
is a case in point. An early observation on NAFTA at the time of its creation had 
noted on the question of integration as follows: 
  
NAFTA, …does not constitute a classical example of a regional agreement 
primarily designed to strengthen regional ties. Despite the fact that free trade 
will reinforce the economic links between the three weaker countries, and 
allow greater economic rationalization within the integrated market, these 
gains are far too limited to consider a regional retreat as a viable economic 
option within the current world context. Not only are the benefits that Canada 
and Mexico can expect to derive from NAFTA limited, but, the advantages of 
regionalism are generally overestimated in the current debate. The North 
American market provides only limited additional export opportunities for 
three countries likely to continue to increase their imports from the rest of the 
world. [34]  
 
 
Deblock and Rioux (1993) above while citing a common decline in trade across all 
three NAFTA States and a comparable increase in the economic strengths and world 
dominance of the then EEC and Japan in Asia, were clear on the significance of 
NAFTA to the USA and by extension to Mexico and Canada who were largely 
dependent on USA trade. In their paper in 1993, they state almost as if they were 
recording the realities facing the present Trump administration that “NAFTA's 
objectives are closely related to North America's need to reassert its position in the 
world economy since the momentum of its enterprises is clearly no longer sufficient 
to support its traditional hegemonic role” [35]. In their assessment:  
 
Through NAFTA, the region, and especially the United States, is seeking to 
create a space within which its big businesses can consolidate their activities 
in order both to derive global comparative advantages from their privileged 
access to three markets, and to improve their strategic position in negotiations 
with Europe and Asia. North American economic integration is therefore 
Page 13 of 20 Journal of International Trade Law and Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of International Trade Law and Policy
14 
 
closely related to a strategic and competitive vision of international economic 
relations in a tripolar world. [36]  
 
 
Whether one agrees with or disputes the notion of a tripolar world today, the 
relevance of the above observation to present day realities under the Trump 
Administration are remarkable. The Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) and its Canadian and Mexican counterparts have already begun the process of 
renegotiating the twenty three year old Agreement with seventeen key objectives for 
the USA. [37] (USTR, 2017). Amongst the contentious issues are proposals for a 
sunset clause by the US, for the Agreement to expire after five years unless renewed 
by the three Member States. [38] Country-specific rules of origin on automobile trade 
are also under discussion. Under existing rules, 62.5% content from any combination 
of the Member states for automobiles can be shipped to any NAFTA states without 
duties. [39] The USA wishes to increase the required content to 80% but also 
proposes that 50% of content should be manufactured in the USA for duty free 
automobile imports from Mexico and Canada. [40]   
 
The tensions in these circumstances will most certainly challenge the future of trade 
not only in the North American region but beyond.  
 
3.7 Theories have to be adaptive: change is constant 
Another presumption in the theory is that of constancy. The principle of pacta sunt 
servanda (agreements must be kept) is an established feature of international 
agreements. This alludes to the fact that the two countries can trust one another to 
abide strictly with the terms of their agreement, always. In our view this presumption 
though compelling falls short of reality. For one, the WTO representation of 
comparative advantage as a theory demands that in the agreement between countries 
A and B, country B will always be satisfied with its profits from bread making. Thus 
even where Country B assesses that with further Research and Development (R&D) 
activities and with financial investments into its automobile industry it may match or 
even exceed country A’s capacity in automobile production, it will not do so. Neither 
would country A attempt bread making, content to leave this industry to country B. 
The fierce competition amongst producers in the modern global market does not 
sustain this interpretation of the theory. It is impractical to retain the suggestion that a 
country is satisfied at producing a particular product when it can explore ways to find 
alternative and cheaper means of producing what it is forced to buy.  
 
Trade agreements in particular, the WTO Agreements, are increasingly seen by the 
public, as external impositions on capacity-poor countries whose governments see no 
room to manoeuvre their way out of the obligations they have entered into. Domestic 
adjustment policies are also criticised because even if they manage not to flout 
existing multilateral agreements, economies may still suffer. The present realities 
suggest that countries are being forced to re-engage with their own domestic needs. 
Again, the Trump presidency highlights this reality. The USA has already pulled out 
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP), a key election campaign promise for President 
Trump. Future trade policy measures under the Trump administration suggest that the 
US will engage in “[R]esisting efforts by other countries – or Members of 
international bodies like the World Trade Organization (WTO) – to advance 
interpretations that would weaken the rights and benefits of, or increase the 
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obligations under, the various trade agreements to which the United States is a party.” 
[41] As the US Trade Policy promises, US trade goals, “can be best accomplished by 
focusing on bilateral negotiations rather than multilateral negotiations – and by 
renegotiating and revising trade agreements when our goals are not being met.” [42]  
 
If the USA will seek to depart from the WTO Agreements and decisions, it is not 
unlikely that other countries may wish to follow suit or at least question their own 
commitments. Future agreements will probably demand greater evidence of positive 
and tangible impact on domestic economies and the lives of people. It is also possible 
that multilateral negotiations may give way to greater bilateralism in trade. [43]  
 
 
 
 
3.8 The need to confront emerging realities 
Basic ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ are no more the sole economic determinants of trade 
arrangements. The analogy with ‘bread making’ and ‘automobile manufacture’ is in 
the light of modern technological advancements and consumer preferences, simplistic. 
Emerging issues in modern living ranging from a ferocious consumer appetite for new 
products and the latest technologies, to environmental considerations, including the 
threats of armed conflicts and terrorism, will determine trade preferences and trade 
partnerships. Future trade negotiations will consequently be heavily influenced by 
political alliances. [44]  
 
If these trends indicate that changes in globalisation are already underway, do they 
predict a change in the rules-based system as it currently stands? Does the 
comparative advantage theory that underpins the rules-based system have to adapt to 
these changes or will the WTO have to redefine the economic foundations for the free 
trade system to adapt to the present socio-political and economic landscape of the 
present? We suspect changes are inevitable. 
 
With communication and the vast advances in technology, the impact of mass 
movements of people, goods and services, capital, has already been overtaken by the 
borderless world of ideas. It may therefore be too early to predict the death of 
globalisation. However, the future demands a multipronged approach to economic 
growth. Greater efficiency in production of goods and services, policies that facilitate 
trade capacity and also generate innovation for new entrants to markets, subsidies, 
protective regulation, all these are essential to economic growth. Diversification and 
innovation are now more important than they ever were before. The previous notion 
of specialisation as a determinant for development or economic growth has not stood 
up to the vast capacities of Chinese industry which turns out a variety of goods 
cheaper and faster than was previously though possible. Rodrik (2004) drawing on a 
number of studies noted that contrary to the conventional understanding, 
specialisation according to comparative advantage is not an essential ingredient for 
development. In his view,  
 
Whatever it is that serves as the driving force of economic development, it 
cannot be the forces of comparative advantage as conventionally understood. 
The trick seems to be to acquire mastery over a broader range of activities, 
instead of concentrating on what one does best. [45]  
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Countries who are yet to capture a significant share of the world market for traded 
goods do not have the time and space that they may have had in previous years. 
Technology is making it virtually impossible for these countries to catch up with 
others who are far out-pacing them in productive capacity. Thus while it may appear 
impossible for a country not to have a comparative advantage in any sector, the 
productive capacities of a technology driven world are making it a reality. Essentially, 
the economies of less industrialised countries which are poor, have poor social and 
institutional systems, lack technological knowledge, and have low skilled labour, will 
still find it difficult to invest and grow industries and produce goods which will 
compete favourably in a world market where countries are retreating to defend their 
own interests first. This truth is relevant even if these poorer countries all agree to 
harmonise their rules and trade agreements, as the AU intends for the African 
continent. Future economic policies whether domestic, bilateral or multilateral must 
factor in these challenges if domestic needs and wants are to be met alongside an 
increasingly aggressive protectionist retreat across world governments.  
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
While the law guarantees or at least suggests a level playing field in a rules-based 
trading system, changes in the political landscape of some of the strongest global 
economic powers are clear indicators that the field may not stay level if indeed it ever 
was.  Political change with the Brexit results in the UK Referendum of June 2016 
means that the UK exits the EU after fifty years. The UK must re-negotiate its trade 
agreements not just with the EU but also with the rest of the world, as a single nation. 
It will have to look out for its own interests. At the same time, the Trump presidency 
has already started re-negotiating its agreement under NAFTA and predicted a 
disinclination from absolute support for the WTO system including its dispute 
settlement body (DSB). Elsewhere, there are long running conflicts, wars, internal 
displacement and mass migration across Africa and the Middle East. There is 
economic flux across Asia and the Americas and indeed the world over with the 
sustained low prices of oil since 2014.  Across the EU, stronger voices for 
nationalism, protectionism and anti-globalisation rhetoric are growing louder. These 
political upheavals portend an erosion of the stability of the world economic and 
trading system.  
 
In short, the era of globalisation is confronting changes. The underpinnings of 
globalisation including the concept of trade liberalisation and the principles of 
comparative advantage which have provided the foundation for the present rules-
based system must also confront these changes if countries are to transit from 
globalisation to de-globalisation with limited shocks to internal and global economic 
systems. It is essentially time to redraw the plan for market participation. Countries 
must have to re-engage with the notion of comparative advantage not in the simple 
format it has erstwhile been engaged with, but with a more strategic and leaner 
approach that caters for domestic interests while still keeping the doors open for 
mutually beneficial trade with others.  
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Advantage a d the Normative Economics of International Trade Policy’ JIEL 
1 (1998), 49 – 82. 
5. See the WTO web page Case for Open Trade Ibid. (Emphasis in original). 
6. For example, see generally, Ha Joon Chang, Bad Samaritans: The Myth of 
Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism Bloosbury Press (Reprint 
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Theory of Value” History of Political Economy (2011) Volume 43, Number 4: 
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Advantage with Smith’s Productivity Theory’. Economic Thought, 3.2, (2014) 
pp. 21-37. 
8. P. Samuelson & W.D.Nordhaus. (2005) p.3-4. 
9. See the Republic of Botswana Government information on Economic growth 
in the country online at 
http://www.gov.bw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=63&Item
id=74. 
10. In this respect, the income from diamonds and the contribution to the economy 
is not unlike the income from crude oil operations in other African countries. 
11. See TPR Botswana W/TPR/S/35, 1 April 1998. 
12. See W/TPR/G/35, 15 April 1998.  
13. See the Republic of Botswana web page op cit.  
14. See the DeBeers Annual Report: ‘Living up to Diamonds – From Natural 
Resources to Shared Wealth’ Report to Society 2007, pp 29. 
15. See Kennedy K. Mbekeani (BIDPA) (2005) ‘Inter-Agency Policy Co-
ordination in Botswana’ WTO Case Study available online: 
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Article 1 GATT). 
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